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or better or worse, in recent years the "standards" movement has become a prominent aspect of the educational landscape across academic levels and in nearly every disciplinary arena. Standards-based assessments of both teachers and students are one of the major strategies being pursued to intervene in the nature of teaching and learning in schools. Educational measurement professionals have brought considerable technical resources to bear on many of the challenges involved in creating defensible standardsbased assessments. Nearly all of their activity, however, has focused on the aspects of the development process that take place after a set of standards has been created, appearing to rely on implicit and potentially problematic assumptions about what standards "are."
In the most basic sense, standards-based assessments are supposed to derive their warrant from a community consensus. It is fundamentally because the community has agreed on a set of standards that it is reasonable to use them to orient assessment instruments. Yet, we do not really know much about the actual process of achieving such a consensus. We do not know what sort of agreement is reasonable to expect or what the implications of this kind of agreement might be for justifying the interpretation, use, and ultimate impact of standards-based assessment. We explore these issues in this article.
The procedure to develop consensual educational standards, as portrayed in a range of professional standards documents, follows a fairly generic pattern ( [NCTM], 1989 [NCTM], , 1991 . In general, a central committee or set of committees is formed by the responsible organization or agency. To reflect the diversity of the field, the agency/organization typically recruits teachers, teacher educators, measurement specialists, content-area experts, and experts from relevant supporting disciplines. Sometimes other representatives of the stakeholder community are included, such as business leaders, policy makers, and/or parents. As the committees develop an initial draft of the standards, they select from a range of material, including past efforts to create standards and curriculum frameworks, their own experience and values, and existing research. These initial drafts are then distributed widely for review to hundreds or even thousands of individuals, groups, and organizations. Comments are collated and reviewed by the committees in an effort to develop a document that reflects these concerns. Through extensive dialogue and often more review by different groups and individuals, the committees slowly move toward "consensus." Even when "complete" and published, however, the standards documents generally acknowledge that they can only be viewed as a temporary achievement, remaining open to future revision as the field itself evolves and changes.
For the purposes of assessment, these standards are then cut free of the contexts in which they were created, from the often contentious and multilayered dialogical history that produced them, and used to orient the devel-opment of assessments and ultimately to guide judges in decisions about individual performances. To what extent are such standards capable of supporting such decisions? To what extent are assessment developers and, ultimately, judges forced to exceed the level of agreement that was reached in the standards creation process in order to make determinate statements about individual performances? If all the participants in the standards creation process examined the concrete decisions (and it is difficult to know who would qualify as a participant), would they consider them consistent with the standards they had developed? These crucial questions tend not to be asked in the context of assessment.
In an effort to systematically reflect on the assumptions entailed in this model of standards-based assessment, we begin with a discussion of Habermas's recent work on the justification and application of norms and laws in democratic societies (Habermas, 1996 ; see also Habermas, 1984 Habermas, , 1990 Habermas, , 1993 , a model which maps quite productively on the process just described. In our effort to understand the nature of the standards creation process, we include a case study of a moment of dialogue among a group of teachers working to agree on a shared standard. The moment is drawn from the preliminary work of INTASC to develop portfolio assessments to assist states in making decisions about teacher licensure. The example is not meant to be unproblematically representative of standards creation dialogues. However, it provides an empirical instantiation, a context in which to engage with Habermas's theoretical assumptions and potential limitations in a more concrete fashion. We also discuss another prominent example of standards-based assessment, the NBPTS program to certify accomplished teachers. We examine how standards like these have been used to guide assessment development and ultimately judgments about the performances of teachers.
From our explorations of Habermas's theory and the two cases of practice, we argue that there are serious problems with key aspects of his framework and with some of the largely implicit assumptions involved in developing standards-based assessment. In the concluding sections of the article, we attempt to imagine how the process of standards creation and application through assessments might be altered to overcome some of these shortcomings. We examine the views of theorists who have drawn on Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics (1987, 1990, 1994/1975) to criticize Habermas's vision of consensus-seeking discourse from a pluralist perspective on ethical decision making that "doesn't make consensus the only game in town" (Hoy, 1994, p. 265; Warnke, 1994) . Our goal is not to solve all of the dilemmas we raise about the process of seeking consensus. However, the assessment community has tended to gloss over many of these issues perhaps because the theoretical/methodological resources needed to study them have not been widely appropriated or developed within the field. Also, perhaps there is an underlying fear that facing these issues would make standards-based assess ment impossible. By showing that it is possible to envision strategies for grappling with these issues in the context of ethical assessment, we hope to encourage the larger community to engage more directly with these challenges.
The Search for Consensus

A Consensus-Based Theory of Standards Justification in Democratic Society
Habermas's writings on the justification and application of norms or laws in democratic societies (1984, 1990, 1993, 1996) seem to reflect important aspects of the approach commonly articulated in the development and use of standards to guide assessment. His work provides a theoretical framework for reflecting on many of the assumptions, possibilities, and limitations of standards-based assessment. Habermas argued that in the modern world it is no longer possible to simply accept authority without question. Instead of resorting to relativism, as he worried some scholars have, or to "privately enacted" forms of justification that require individuals to "fictitiously" bracket their own social context, he sought a procedure for justifying norms and laws in a "real" dialogical process of rational argumentation (Habermas, 1990, pp. 68, 198) . His theory of discourse is modeled, in the most basic sense, on a fair dialogue among equals: Participants attempt to reach consensus with others by giving reasons and grappling with the arguments presented by their dialogical partners. Agreements are valid only if they are reached because of the power of good reasons, if they are unaffected by coercion or the effects of unequal power, and if everyone has an equal chance to contribute to the dialogue (Habermas, 1990 (Habermas, , 1993 . He distinguished "communicative action," when individuals attempt to rationally motivate one another to reach a "mutual understanding," from "strategic action" or "bargaining," when individuals attempt to influence one another through threat of sanctions or promise of gratification (Habermas, 1990, p. 58; Habermas, 1996, p. 140) . [In his earlier work Habermas (1984) , called this the "ideal speech situation," although he has since abandoned this label because of the misinterpretations it provoked (Habermas, 1993, pp. 163-164) .] Habermas (1998) proposed this model of discourse for justifying two sorts of claims: "truth claims in regard to facts that we assert with reference to objects in the objective world" (p. 317) and "claims to the rightness of norms and commands that are recognized in an intersubjectively shared social world" (p. 317; see also Habermas, 1984, pp. 8-23) . Truth claims are justified in theoretical discourse that draws on observational evidence. Because claims to the rightness of norms (or in our case, standards) are intended to regulate people's actions (Habermas, 1993, p. 160) or access to resources, participants have the added obligation of considering the "consequences and the side effects its [the norm's] general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests" (Habermas, 1990, p. 65) . Habermas (1990) referred to this model of discourse, to justify norms or laws, as "practical discourse" or "discourse ethics."
For participants to achieve a consensus about the rightness of a norm or law, Habermas (1996) argued that they must make certain presuppositions about the nature of their interaction: They must "presuppose . . . that they [speakers and hearers have] conferred identical meanings on the expressions they employed" (p. 19), that the "expressions keep the same meaning in the diverse situations and speech acts in which they are employed" (p. 11), and that the reasons supporting the consensus "convince all the parties in the same way" (p. 166). If participants interpret an expression differently and/or agree on a norm for different reasons, then the agreement reflects a compromise rather than a consensus (p. 166). Thus, the legitimation achieved through the rational motivation of all involved to accept the norm as right or just for guiding people's action would "snap" (p. 166).
Habermas is clear that the requirements of practical discourse are never entirely achieved in the real world. Instead, the features of practical discourse that he described provide useful guiding (or "regulative") ideals, which he acknowledged are at best only approximated by actual dialogues. They serve a critical function, allowing us to evaluate our actual practices in terms of these expectations. Because the ideal is never reached and because the world is constantly changing, agreements reached in contexts that approximate practical discourse are always tentative, always open to reassessment and revision (Habermas, 1996) .
In an ideal society, Habermas (1996, pp. 323-327) imagined that all of our actions would be regulated by rational dialogue. To make a decision, we would speak with those who would be affected by it and reach a consensus before any action was taken. He realized that this approach would be impossibly burdensome even in the smallest community, however. He solved this problem, in part, by arguing that every concrete instantiation of practical discourse requires local participants to act as if they were engaging with a larger "ideally expanded audience," attempting to at least imagine the kinds of reasons those not present might raise. Habermas thus posited the "public," in which the distributed, overlapping dialogues of particular groups or individuals slowly aggregate, over time, into collective "opinions" that are detached from the particulars of local contexts and the individuals who contributed to them. "Public opinions" make it possible for committees made up of "the broadest possible spectrum of interpretive perspectives, including the views and voices of marginal groups" (Habermas, 1996, p. 183) to approximate the requirements of a discourse ethics that includes the relevant contributions of all (Habermas, 1996, pp. 170-171) . In standards creation, the process of forming a broadly representative committee, which further informs itself through a wide range of existing resources and public commentary on working drafts, sustains the assumption of widespread "professional consensus."
Even with the representative committee approach, Habermas argued that in complex modern societies it is impossible for every decision to issue from the time-consuming and difficult process of democratic dialogue. For example, complex forms of bureaucracy allow armies and corporations (and large-scale assessment systems) to perform complex tasks (like scoring individual portfolios) without rational agreement from individual participants. The danger is that society will be increasingly directed by absolutely necessary, yet increasingly autonomous, systems that function outside of the rationally controlling force of fair dialogue (Habermas, 1987) . Habermas (1996) argued that societies can only subject these systems to democratic control through something like a legal system. Unlike other steering systems, the legal system remains ultimately subject to the rationally achieved consensus represented by dialogically created laws (or standards in our case). He argued that the rational character of such laws gives them a dual character: They are rational norms that each person should agree upon without coercion, while at the same time they carry real consequences to those who break them (Habermas, 1996, p. 29) . Maintaining the democratic character of the legal system, however, requires that the democratic processes of law creation and justification be separated from systems of application (Habermas, 1996, p. 188) . In the special case of educational assessment, this indicates that while the standards may remain open to critique, in the assessment context, once they are established, they are supposed to serve individual judges as fixed guidelines.
Habermas realized that standards are used interpretively when applied to specific cases. Judges can only make good faith efforts to remain within the scope of the particular standards, guided by their training into a common perspective with other judges (Habermas, 1996, pp. 220, 234) . Although our understanding of standards must evolve to some extent in the process of application, Habermas (1996) would not want assessment practices to "selfprogram" (p. 188) themselves (in our case in the hands of relatively isolated judges) in ways that exceed the mandate provided by the community consensus that initially created them.
Case Study of a Moment of Standards Creation
In this section, we examine one effort to develop standards in light of the assumptions underlying Habermas's discourse ethics. Our goal is to understand the nature of the agreement reflected in the achieved standard. It is important to note from the outset that we have consciously refrained in this case study from examining the extent to which Habermas's ideal of "fairness" was achieved. Instead, we have focused on the substantive nature of the agreement that appeared to underlie the "standard" produced. Like Habermas, we know that no process ever reaches the dialogical ideal represented by the discourse ethics. Even in the most intimate settings, issues of inequality, cultural and racial difference, gender, and class affect dialogues in subtle ways, giving some voices more authority while silencing others. As Habermas (1996) noted, however, the ideal of fair dialogue is meant to be a regulative ideal, one that we strive for but acknowledge that we can never meet. In this article, arguing about whether a standards development process achieved a reasonable level of fairness (although always a crucial question) may distract us from asking what would be achieved even if a fair dialogue were possible. Although we acknowledge that forces of inequality were surely at work in the example we examine, we have bracketed these problems. Our point is not just that this particular group did not reach consensus (they did not) or that consensus is difficult to reach (it is), but that evidence from this dialogue indicates that the standard we can reasonably expect to achieve even in the most equal dialogue differs significantly from that indicated by Habermas's theoretical model and implied in the practices and rhetoric of standards-based assessment.
The context for our first case study is INTASC's program to develop standards and assessments intended to assist states in supporting the preparation and licensure of new teachers. Using the framework developed by the NBPTS, INTASC (1992) crafted model standards for beginning teaching applicable across subject areas. More recently, INTASC has been developing discipline-specific standards and performance assessments in different subject areas/levels of teaching to be used to inform licensing decisions.
It is important at this point in the discussion to draw a distinction between performance and content standards. As the Panel on StandardsBased Education Reform of The National Academy of Education (NAE) defines them, "Content standards are broad descriptions of the knowledge and skills students [or in our case, teachers] should acquire and be able to do in a particular subject area" (McClaughlin & Shepard, 1995, p. xviii) and "Performance standards are the more specific concrete examples and explicit definitions of what students must know and be able to do to demonstrate mastery of the content standards" (McClaughlin & Shepard, 1995, p. xix) . As the panel noted, performance standards can help to "clarify and explain" content standards (McClaughlin & Shepard, 1995, p. 34 ). As we illustrate in our second case below, there can be substantial overlap in language between content and performance standards, especially at the higher levels of performance.
Consistent with NAE's definitions, INTASC is developing both content and performance standards in each subject area. We focus on the development of the performance standards intended to guide judges in evaluating portfolios from beginning English/Language Arts (ELA) teachers. In particular, we examine the process through which one part of one standard was developed by a group of experienced teachers and proposed to the larger committee charged with the initial description of different performance levels for the portfolio assessment. At this point in the development of the standards (1997), the relationship between INTASC's ELA performance and content standards could best be described as dynamic. A draft of the ELA content standards had been developed and was still undergoing revision by largely the same committee that was developing the portfolio-specific performance standards. Prior to this meeting, the draft content standards had been used by the committee to guide the development of the portfolio handbook (instructions to beginning teachers for assembling a portfolio) and the evaluation framework (an outline to be used by portfolio evaluators in collating and analyzing evidence from the portfolio).
Context and Method
The 5-day meeting that provides the context for our case study took place about 3 weeks before INTASC's first attempt to field test the process of
The Search for Consensus scoring the ELA portfolios of beginning teachers. Nine veteran ELA teachers, teacher-educators, and administrators, many of whom had been a part of the ELA assessment development process since its inception, gathered from across the United States. They were supported by INTASC's lead ELA consultant, who acted as the meeting's facilitator, and by other consultants and staff (including the two authors of this article). Their charge was to create a set of descriptive statements for each of four possible performance levels. In the case we examine, the teachers were creating a standard that would guide judges as to the difference between a "2" (candidate fails this assessment but may repeat) and a "3" (candidate passes this assessment). They were also to develop a set of benchmark portfolios to concretely represent each score point (although we do not focus on this aspect of their dialogue). To refresh their memories of the content standards already drafted, the facilitator asked committee members to map the components of the evaluation framework onto the draft content standards, showing which standards related to each component.
We had a broad corpus of data available to us, including audiotapes of the meeting, artifacts distributed and constructed, notes and transcripts from a subsequent portfolio scoring session, and transcripts of exit interviews conducted with each teacher at the conclusion of the scoring session. In preparing for this case study, we listened to tapes of the meeting, which included large group, small group, and paired settings. We mapped important events and searched for moments when disagreements about the wording of standards evolved to tentative agreements. In particular, we searched for segments of dialogue where individual perspectives were sufficiently well articulated that the meanings of the achieved agreement for individual participants could be illuminated (as distinct from segments where the wording of tentative standards was proposed and quickly agreed upon with little exploration of the reasons for agreement or the meanings of the words selected). We focused on a segment that took place about half-way through the second day of the workshop among a group of four teachers (one of whom had recently become an administrator). They were designated Group 2 by the meeting's facilitator. We chose this segment because it provided the most explicit, sustained discussion of individual perspectives on an issue. We analyzed this segment of dialogue in detail in an effort to understand the disagreements that arose and the nature of the final agreement that was reached. Our analysis was driven by a subset of Habermas's presuppositions about discourse ethics: Speakers and hearers must "presuppose . . . that they conferred identical meanings on the expressions they employed" (1996, p. 19) , that the "expressions keep the same meaning in the diverse situations and speech acts in which they are employed" (1996, p. 11) , and that the reasons supporting the consensus "convince all the parties in the same way" (1996, p. 166) . (As noted above, we bracketed presuppositions and questions about the "fairness" of the dialogue.) In the dialogue reported below, we traced the process through which the wording of the standard was debated and constructed, evaluated, affirmed, and then reported to the larger group, representing those segments where individual perspectives on the meaning of the words or the reasons for the agreement were made explicit. We looked for explicit acknowledgment of disagreement as well as more subtle differences in how seemingly similar perspectives were articulated. To develop an even deeper understanding of each person's perspectives on competent teaching (and the experiences that shaped them), especially with respect to the issues raised in the dialogue, we conducted extended postworkshop interviews (and in two cases, we visited classrooms). Finally, we shared the summaries of these interviews and an early draft of this article with the four teachers in Group 2 so that their responses might be taken into account.
Analysis of Group 2's Dialogue
The dialogue took place in the afternoon session on the second day of the meeting. The four members of Group 2 were discussing which side of the crucial 2/3 (pass/fail) line they would place four different portfolios (they were told that a score of 2 represented "candidate fails this assessment but may repeat" and a score of 3 represented "candidate passes this assessment"). They had some difficulty agreeing on the placement of the four portfolios. They attributed this difficulty to the fact that, for this specific exercise, they had really only skimmed through the portfolios. After they discussed specific portfolios, they began developing descriptive statements to help readers decide what the difference between a 2 and a 3 was like, often referring back to the portfolios they had just discussed. They had been given a preliminary outline of the evidence readers would be required to gather during the portfolio evaluation process (developed at a previous meeting by many of the same people). They had to develop descriptive statements, or performance standards, for each aspect of the outline. The moment of dialogue began when Helen started the discussion about composing from section C of the outline:
Describe:
• the context for writing-how audience, purpose, form are addressed
• how text structures and conventions are presented • the nature of composing as a process • the nature of revision and editing Given all of this, describe:
• the relationship between the writer and the text.
The discussion that ensued revolved, in part, around whether it was important for teachers to provide writing "models" for students. At the end of this discussion, they came to a preliminary agreement on what was proposed as a part of the performance standard for a score of 2 with respect to "composing": "Students are not helped to access the process."
This dialogue represented a moment in the larger process of standards creation, informed by a long history of discussions in the ELA community, in
The Search for Consensus earlier INTASC meetings, and in the standards development meeting. The question about whether teachers should provide models to students (and, as we note below, even about what counted as a "model") reflect core conflicts in the ELA community about what constitutes good teaching. Conflicts between "whole language" and "phonics" camps, "teacher-directed" versus "student-centered," and "process" versus "skills" oriented pedagogical approaches have split the field (Kempenstall, 1997; Strickland, 1998) . These differences often seem to stem from cultural and class differences and different world experiences (Delpit, 1995) . At the time of this dialogue, there appeared to be general agreement in the group that providing rigid models for student writing did not represent effective teaching. However, during the previous day and a half, participants had framed this issue differently in their comments. For example, the meeting's facilitator used the metaphor of helping students analyze "a real genre in the world" when discussing the issue of providing models. This was consistent with the most recent draft of the ELA content standards that encouraged teachers to "help students understand the structure and conventions of different genre of written text and help students develop strategies for composing." In contrast, another consultant at the meeting talked about the importance of providing students with concrete text structures that they would "grow out of." A range of subtly different perspectives had been presented at different times at this and at previous meetings, and this history probably informed the moment of dialogue that we examine. The participants in the dialogue that follows also brought a history with them to the discussion. For example, Kevin had made it clear a number of times during the meeting that he preferred more "process"-oriented approaches; Helen and Sandra often spoke of providing students with "structures" or models.
Below are excerpts from Group 2's discussion of modeling. 1 Their dialogue moved in a spiral, in which modeling and the candidate's approach to "text structures and conventions" was a central theme to which the group returned amidst discussions of a number of other related issues. The other issues they discussed surely related to this central topic. However, we focused on the areas where they discussed "modeling" most directly. Helen began the group's discussion of "C. Composing":
Helen: Can we say that, ah, the, the success-the successful portfolio illustrates. . . . (sigh.) Uses. . . Articulates the process for students and models it? Or, articulates a process and models it?
Kevin: (pause) Certainly it prese-, it presents the process clearly, however it goes about doing that. . . Yeah. Uh-huh.
Lisa: Yeah. I was wondering about models that, um, have we seen one that was. . . . Sandra: I mean, it's, if they don't have a model they can't do anything.
Kevin: [. . . .] There's whole, there's whole, there's whole books and libraries written about the limits of models in teaching composition.
Helen started by referring directly to the issue of modeling. She also presented a number of other possible terms they might use for defining exactly how a teacher presented a process to students, including "use," "illustrate," and "articulate." She started them off with a range of possible perspectives. However, Helen appeared to understand "articulate," as she explained later when she reported Group 2's accomplishments to the large group (below), as indicating that a teacher had essentially given students a clear structure. Thus, her initial efforts to define a statement emphasized a relatively structural approach.
Although Kevin agreed in his response that a teacher must present "the process clearly," his response resisted Helen's attempt to define more specifically how a teacher might do this. A few turns of talk later, Kevin extended his disagreement, using research to support his argument that models are a limited way to teach composition. It is not entirely clear what Lisa was referring to in her comment. Sandra joined the discussion, apparently supporting Helen's position that modeling is an important facet in effective teaching of composing.
In his response, it is important to note that Kevin avoided all of the words that Helen had provided as possible characterizations of "the process." Instead, he framed the issue as one of "clarity." Kevin did use the term process in his reply, however, which becomes a point of agreement that the group, in all subsequent attempts to arrive at an acceptable sentence, will draw upon.
As the dialogue continued, Helen brought up the issue of modeling again. This time, Kevin responded by referring to a particular portfolio that he believed showed that a teacher had very "rigid notions of how [text structures and conventions have . . .] got to work [. . . It was] completely divorced from content," again attempting to establish the dangers of models. Helen agreed with his characterization of the portfolio.
A couple of minutes later, Sandra refocused the group on the need to write a descriptive statement for "C. Composing" and Helen again presented a possible sentence.
Helen: Can we say something about, [. . .] in the twos that either the process, a process is unclear, or is, or students are not helped to identify a process? Or to access the process?
Kevin: Or, the teacher, the teacher himself or herself seems unclear about, about the process. [. . . . T]hose, those who are lower scores, ah, do not address how audience purpose and form work together and, and, and coalesce. Uh, nor do they show how text structures and conventions, um, are, um, related to meaning, um. . Interestingly, during this third round, Helen finally dropped the term modeling and other descriptive terms from her statement and adopted Kevin's earlier use of the relatively vague reference to "clarity" to describe what they appear to have agreed is a "process." Kevin responded to Helen's increasingly vague statements by describing the "process" in fairly specific and relatively organic terms. He discussed "how audience, purpose and form work together and coalesce." As Helen moved to a more neutral position, Kevin was making a stand on a different vision of how composition should be taught. Sandra responded to Kevin's attempt by returning to language that is more like Helen's, focusing on how the teacher arranges and then monitors student learning in the classroom. Again, it is not entirely clear what Lisa means by her statement, but she appears to resist any effort to set firm "categories" for effective composing. Interestingly, Helen's last try at a statement for composing is actually the sentence that the group adopted, even though they continued to argue about substantive issues with respect to "accessing the process."
The four do eventually agree on a statement. Importantly, "students are not helped to access the process" avoids all of the descriptive terms that both Kevin and Helen have proposed to define how a teacher helps students access the process. Kevin's final statement, especially, indicates that all four have not overcome their disagreements about the how issue. Yet, on the audiotape, it seems clear that they were relatively satisfied with the statement they had constructed, even though they all appeared to understand that the statement did not represent a complete consensus.
After they finished their small group discussion, Group 2 joined the rest of the meetings' participants and reported what they had accomplished. Helen acted as the group's main spokesperson. When she reached their statement about "C. Composing," she described how she interpreted their statement, focusing on the ability of effective teachers to "articulate" a process. It is important to note that the sentence is only a candidate sentence to be proposed to the larger group. Other small groups were also engaged in the same process.
Helen: And this one we struggled with the way to say it, which is sort
The first thing that is interesting about this discussion is that Helen did not use the term model in her initial report to the group. However, she did use one of the other terms she had initially proposed but that they had not agreed on, articulate, which she described in a manner very similar to modeling. As it became clear during the interviews, Helen interpreted "students are not helped to access the process" to fit her vision of good teaching,
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an interpretation that appeared to exceed the agreement they had reached in the group.
None of the other group members explicitly disagreed with her in this group setting. However, after her statements about models, Kevin presented a contrasting interpretation of the candidate's performance in "portfolio F." In portfolio F, a teacher had worked with his students to develop an understanding of how movie reviews are structured, using an example written by Gene Siskel. Although Helen emphasized that the teacher provided a professional model to students to follow as they wrote a movie review, Kevin focused on the fact that the teacher and the students were involved in critiquing the professional model. Kevin concluded by reiterating his discomfort with the term model. Helen does not appear to disagree with Kevin's interpretation, although it is not the aspect that she stressed or deemed most important about the interaction with respect to judging the teacher's performance.
If they had talked more, the teachers in Group 2 might have achieved a richer and deeper level of agreement on a standard for this aspect of composing.
2 But, then again, they might not have. For example, after 3 weeks of participation in INTASC-related activities that summer, Kevin revised his position on peer review groups in a way that diverged from those of his colleagues. He said that he would no longer use peer review groups in his classroom because he had become convinced that students did not give useful feedback to their partners. Yet, this was not a conclusion reached by other participants that summer. Helen and Sandra, who attended the same meetings, remained committed to peer review groups.
Even the areas of seemingly straightforward agreement and disagreement are not as clear-cut as they might seem. In the transcripts of Group 2's dialogue about composing, the disagreement seemed fairly clear. Sandra and Helen supported modeling, whereas Kevin did not. Lisa was difficult to place, even though her "agreement" was required for them to present this "standard" as a group product. As we learned more about each of their personal pedagogical visions, especially through interviews, our understanding of the nature of their disagreement became increasingly complex. It became increasingly difficult to position each of them with respect to each other. For example, did Helen and Sandra really agree on modeling? When she talks in more detail, Sandra characterizes models as structures-either provided by the teacher or developed with students-that students ultimately appropriate for their own purposes. Although Helen does not exactly disagree with this, her interpretation of modeling is based partially on her conviction that information in modern society is increasingly resident, for example, in "hypertext structures"; unlike Sandra, Helen views modeling as a broader effort to help students learn to "trace the [changing] patterns in any kind of informational [arena] they find themselves in."
Another way to establish clear distinctions between the perspectives of these teachers might be to draw on the classic teacher-directed, studentcentered polarity that is often associated with those who are pro-and anti-modeling. However, the more we know about these teachers, the more difficult it is to determine where such a line might be drawn. For example, Sandra argues that it is important for teachers to provide concrete structures for students. Yet, this is only one aspect of a larger vision of pedagogy that emphasizes the importance of paying attention to and constantly altering instruction in response to the needs of individual learners. In fact, Sandra reports that the most accomplished moment of teaching she observed occurred when students ran their class with very little overt direction from their teacher. She noted, "You could see that [the students] . . . had done this . . . earlier where it was more teacher-directed. But they had got to the point where they knew what to do. And they were just applying it" without direct support. In contrast, despite his more process-oriented approach, in which "structure is organic to the things [students are] going to write about," Kevin often has a clear vision of the path he intends his students to take in his classroom. He worries when students cannot "find the path" he has developed for a particular class or when they "get arrested [in their] development" along this path. Thus, he may, in some ways, actually be more directive in his own way in facilitating this long-term movement than Sandra.
From one perspective, the teachers in Group 2 seem to agree. In no particular order, they all value extensive long-range planning, multicultural literature, encouraging students' personal connections with topics discussed in class, strategies that lead to student independence, and more. Yet, only the smallest step can change the perspective entirely and from this new perspective, these teachers do not seem to agree on anything. For example, terms like modeling and student-centered take on a significantly different valence, drawing their meaning from a different history of experience. In some instances, disagreements like these may not affect the score a portfolio receives. Judges can agree on a pass/fail decision for different reasons (as these teachers did with Portfolio F). However, in other instances, disagreements may make the difference between whether a teacher passes or fails an exam. For example, one need only consider Group 2's different interpretations of key phrases in their standard to imagine concrete examples (specific portfolios) that would split this fragile consensus apart.
Group 2 believed they had reached an agreement with their phrase. At the same time, they realized that significant disagreements remained in how each interprets this statement. What, then, had they achieved? Is "students are not helped to access the process" too vague to be a standard? Should they have worked harder to achieve a more concrete agreement? If Group 2's preliminary effort is representative of standards we can expect, what does this imply for an assessment that would use this standard?
Reviewing Some Practical Implications of Consensus-Seeking Discourse 3 A crucial aspect of Habermas's model is his argument that our ability to legitimately cut standards free of the dialogic contexts in which they were
The Search for Consensus created and use them to direct the action of relatively isolated judges arises from the assumption that the standards reflect a substantive consensus of the larger community that created them. As demonstrated in our case study, however, a simple consensus does not truly reflect the complexity of the achievement of the teachers in Group 2. We argue that this problem is relatively representative of the challenges faced by standards creation dialogues in general.
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To illustrate the practical implication of these concerns, we examine the NBPTS's assessment program to certify accomplished teachers. First, we consider the public representation of the (content) standards (NBPTS, 1996) in light of what we know about the actual process through which they were created (Hattie, in press ). Second, we describe some of the decisions that assessment developers made (Educational Testing Service [ETS], 1998; Pearlman, in press) to turn this abstract set of standards into an assessment system that provides reliable pass/fail decisions. (See also Jaeger, 1998, and Moss, in press, for extended reviews of the NBPTS validity research agenda.) Along with Habermas, we raise the question: To what extent have assessment developers had to exceed the mandate that the consensual standards provide?
We describe a typical standards document from the NBPTS, which represents one of over 30 certification areas in which the the board is developing standards and assessments. Readers of the final document are informed (NBPTS, 1996) that the standards:
Represent a professional consensus on the critical aspects of practice that distinguish exemplary teachers in the field from novice or journeymen teachers. Cast in terms of actions that teachers take to advance student outcomes, these standards also incorporate the essential knowledge, skills, dispositions, and commitments that allow teachers to practice at a high level.
5 (p. 1)
As an example, the Early Adolescence/English Language Arts (EA/ELA) Standards comprises 14 distinct standards, each of which is briefly asserted and then elaborated. For instance, Standard II states: "Accomplished EA/ELA teachers set attainable and worthwhile learning goals for students and develop meaningful learning opportunities while extending to students an increasing measure of control over how those goals are pursued" (NBPTS, 1996, p. 13 ). This standard is elaborated into a full-page description (p. 17) that includes statements like the following: "Educational goal-setting is an interactive process in the middle-grades English teacher's classroom. . . . These activities often include a strong mixture of student involvement and direction." Also, "In carrying out learning activities, accomplished teachers adjust their practice, as appropriate, based on student feedback and provide many alternative avenues to the same learning destinations." Despite the increased elaboration in this excerpt, it is clear that this standard provides ample room for multiple interpretations as we described in our analysis of the tentative part of a performance standard created by Group 2. The document does not contain concrete examples of what teaching in a manner consistent with this standard looks like. (In this respect, it differs from other standards documents [INTASC, 1995; NCTE/IRA, 1996; NCTM, 1989 NCTM, , 1991 , which we discuss below.) Based on the evidence that is publicly available (Hattie, in press ) about the NBPTS's process, the committee encountered many differences in perspective on significant issues that had to be resolved before the final document was produced, including:
Ought the focus of classrooms of outstanding practitioners in middle grades ELA be principally on content, on skills, on pupils? Is there "core knowledge" in ELA that all candidates for Board certification must be expected to possess in some depth? [and] Is it necessary for teachers to be able to talk about theory or is it sufficient to show knowledge through classroom practice? (Hattie, in press, p. 5) Using existing records (such as meeting notes, memos, and evolving drafts), Hattie (in press) characterized the process through which a different standards committee resolved a similar issue: "Should an early adolescent generalist [EA/G] have specialist knowledge in all the subjects they taught and how to teach them, or should there be some reduced requirement [from what would be expected of a secondary teacher]?" (p. 10). The process of resolution involved having the committee members write memoranda of their positions on this issue; summarizing, circulating, and discussing the memoranda; drafting a compromise that encompassed both models and allowed a candidate to choose an exercise more related to one than the other; drafting vignettes to illustrate both models; seeking information on how other standards committees had resolved the issue and advice from National Board which preferred "the model not of the secondary model coming down, but the elementary model going up" (p. 10); considering advice from the Board's liaison staff which prompted them "to seek a clear stance" (p. 10); forming a subcommittee to review all the evidence; and, finally, drafting a solution that "would embed the subject matter knowledge requirements in the standards, would value teachers' ability to use that knowledge well, and would make clear that command of this knowledge was essential for high level performance on several of the standards."
As illustrated above, the published standards documents do not represent any of the differences in perspective or the process through which they were resolved. The consensus that is achieved and made available for public review is at a level of generality that rises above any differences in perspective that might have been reflected in the vignettes of teaching practice the committee members shared or in their different positions on major issues. Hattie (in press) reports that the majority of comments on the EA/G standards were positive. Tellingly, the only general concern Hattie reports is:
A small portion of the reviewers were concerned that the standards may be too broad and general for a teacher to adequately self-assess where they are in relation to the standards. Recommendations to address this concern included the addition of supportive explanations and vignettes. (p. 14) This general set of statements, now abstracted from the process that created it, is used to guide assessment development.
At this point, the assessment developers must make a complex series of decisions about how to assess teachers' performances, each one of which reflects human judgments among alternative possibilities, alternative ways of operationalizing these content standards. Pearlman (in press), one of the National Board's senior developers at ETS, describes the problem that the assessment developers have faced in moving from the general standards document to specific assessment tasks:
What they [the content standards] do not do is discriminate among all the qualities and characteristics they articulate: everything is important, nothing is either less or more important. The assessment design must choose from among all of these qualities and characteristics. . . . So the topography of the assessment represents an interpretation of the Standards document, rather than a reflection of it. (p. 18) Particular choices made by the National Board's assessment developers (ETS, 1998) include decisions about assessment tasks and guidelines for candidates; the description of different levels of performance on those tasks that assessors use in assigning scores (scoring rubrics); the selection of sample responses to illustrate those performance levels for training and certifying assessors (benchmarks); the nature of the training assessors receive and the practices in which they engage; the determination of the weights different tasks receive in computing an overall score; and the determination of a passing score. These decisions allow the assessment developers to transform a general standard like "teachers set attainable and worthwhile learning goals for students" into a replicable pass/fail decision about individual performances.
The context in which these decisions are made varies both in the representativeness of the committee making them and the extent to which the results are available for public or professional review outside the committee of assessment developers. For instance, the portfolio handbooks containing the assessment tasks for that portion of the assessment are created by a committee of experienced teachers and are available for public review as are the scoring rubrics that draw closely on the abstract language of the content standards.
6 However, the benchmarks, the concrete examples of performance that are used to train judges to apply the general performance standards, may be selected by as few as three people (ETS, 1998) and are not available for public review. As we asked at the beginning of this article: To what extent are the achieved standards capable of supporting such decisions? To what extent are assessment developers and, ultimately, judges, forced to exceed the level of agreement that was reached in the standards creation process in order to make determinate, replicable statements about individual performances?
Shifting the Emphasis From Consensus to Understanding and Learning From Differences
We have argued that Habermas's theory usefully reflects key aspects of the assumptions underlying the work of standards-based assessment programs like that of INTASC the National Board, and, by association, a range of other standards-oriented assessment-based approaches to educational reform. However, as our case studies have illustrated, there are potential problems with these assumptions, problems that prefigure prominent criticisms of Habermas's discourse ethics and point to alternative solutions. In this section, we summarize the criticisms of discourse ethics, explore a pluralist model of dialogue that "does not make consensus the only game in town" (Hoy, 1994, p. 265) , and consider its practical implications for standardsbased assessment.
Criticisms of Habermas's Discourse Ethics
Even as staunch a defender of Habermas as McCarthy (e.g., 1981 suggests that "Habermas' conception of practical discourse is too restrictive to serve as a model, even as an ideal model, of . . . collective decision making in the democratic public sphere" (1997, p. 68). Other critics have been more trenchant in their concerns. First, critics have argued that Habermas's model of consensus-seeking dialogue is simply not a good characterization of actual dialogue about norms and standards. Hoy (1994) argued, "In real inquiries, agreement does not appear to be the essential telos [or goal] of understanding, but a fortunate by-product" (p. 265). When they do agree on a stated outcome, participants in actual dialogues do not necessarily interpret expressions in the same way (Warnke, 1994), agree on a norm for the same reasons (Hoy, 1994) , or arrive at a clear consensus based purely on the force of the better argument (McCarthy, 1997). For example, in our case study, even simple terms like process and modeling have very different meanings for each of the participants, even when they appear to be agreeing (in the case of Helen and Sandra, for example). These differences of opinion are not likely to be resolved or eliminated through further dialogue. Their commitments to particular forms of teaching and particular understandings of terms like modeling and process originate in their particular histories of experiences in the world. Second, critics have worried that the norms generated through practical discourse can be too general and abstract "to deal with the controversies that arise . . . over concrete questions of justice and action" (Warnke, 1994, p. 100 ). This concern is no surprise to assessment developers who consistently use benchmarks or other concrete examples to illustrate different levels of performance in preparing readers to judge those performances. As the NBPTS's (ETS, 1998) technical manual states: "Benchmarks 'anchor' the score scale and rubric for the assessors-the language of the rubric is made 'real' and pegged to a level of accomplishment through concrete ex-
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amples" (p. 58). One problem with this assessment practice, however, is that the adjudication of individual cases, including sometimes even the selection of benchmarks (as with the NBPTS), does not always take place in the public sphere. Thus, there is little or no opportunity for public review of the way in which norms are being specified in individual cases. Although some standards documents (INTASC, 1995; NCTE/IRA, 1996; NCTM, 1989 NCTM, , 1991 present brief vignettes or samples of work to illustrate standards, they typically only illustrate a single standard or subset of standards. Therefore, they provide little guidance about how a complete set of standards work together to inform the decision about an individual case. Rarely is there opportunity for external review of the meaning of a set of standards in light of complete cases that must be decided.
Finally, perhaps the most pivotal criticism of discourse ethics is that the single-minded goal of consensus risks masking diversity. This is because the the stated outcome can gloss over consequential differences that were not overcome in the dialogue that led to the standard's creation (as in our case study) and because the privileging of agreement (and the exigencies of time) can induce participants to assume too quickly that they mean the same thing or agree for the same reasons without exploring their disagreements (Hoy, 1994, pp. 206-207; Warnke, 1994, p. 154) . Further, as Hoy noted, an idealized presupposition such as thinking "about what all ideal judges would say is such an empty notion that it strikes me as being more likely to be used simply to reinforce one's existing beliefs" (p. 268). Apple (1992) suggested that the standards produced as a result of a search for consensus in spite of the diversity of the larger community ultimately provides only "a penumbra of vagueness so that powerful groups or individuals who would otherwise disagree can fit under the umbrella" (p. 413).
What do we gain by understanding these concerns? There is a sense in which this is not new information for Habermas. He acknowledged, for example, that these ideals are rarely, if ever, fully obtained; they are "partly counterfactual" (1990, p. 92). Despite our best efforts, the consensus that is reached in actual dialogue is always "contaminated" with remnants of disagreement. Given the practical limitations of real dialogue, we must do the best we can to make sure the ideals of practical discourse are "adequately approximated" (Habermas, 1990, p. 92) for the purposes at hand. Habermas's model is not based on the assumption that consensus can be fully achieved, but rather on his conclusion that believing (and acting on the belief) that rational consensus is possible is the only way to morally justify norms and laws to which all are held accountable. If we do not, he fears that the alternatives are coercion, manipulation, and in the case of political dispute, possibly even violence (McCarthy, 1997) . There are at least two questions to consider in examining standards creation dialogues: Given the agreements we can reasonably expect to achieve in a diverse society, are Habermas's ideals the most productive ones to guide our practice? If not (and we think not), what are the alternatives? Habermas (1996) acknowledged a different option when consensus cannot be rationally achieved and the discourse must be "interrupted in view of institutional pressures to decide" (p. 179). He noted that an essentially temporary decision can be reached by majority rule recording "the interim result of a discursive opinion-forming process . . . [that] is in principle resumable" (1996, p. 179) . In this case, however, the minority opinions must be acknowledged so that there is an explicit understanding about what has been excluded. Habermas (1996) used the example of a dissenting opinion in a Supreme Court ruling: "The dissenting opinion attached to the justification of a Supreme Court ruling, for example, is meant to record arguments that in similar cases might convince the majority of a future panel of judges" (p. 179). A few agencies (e.g., the National Research Council) allow dissenting opinions in their consensus documents. In Habermas's solution, the perspectives of some individuals and groups, although included in the official record, can have no impact on the decisions of judges. Also the majority's decision is subject to the same criticisms we have raised above. While Habermas's solution resembles the solution explored below, our approach differs from Habermas because it retains an admixture of agreement and disagreement resident in the standards we can reasonably expect to achieve and it imagines an assessment process that takes the dissensus into account.
Hermeneutic Conversation as an Alternative to Consensus-Seeking Discourse
In this section, we explore an alternative vision of dialogue that does not privilege agreement (or consensus) as the only successful outcome. The contrast between Habermas's model of practical discourse and interpretive (Warnke, 1994) or hermeneutic (Hoy, 1994) conversation centers on whether "rational consensus" is the most appropriate goal. In hermeneutic conversation, agreement is seen as one possible outcome of an interaction where the primary goals are for participants to understand and learn from their differing perspectives on the subject matter under discussion.
Our goal in exploring this alternative theoretical vision and, subsequently, the concrete assessment practices it implies, is not to establish that it is somehow the one right answer to all of the challenges to current standards development and assessment practices. Instead, this alternative model is meant as a tentative response to an underlying fear we sense in the larger assessment community: If we relinquish the Habermasian assumptions around consensus that inform current practices, it will be impossible to engage in any ethical assessment at all. Our goal is to show that it is possible to imagine practical alternatives to current approaches, even if our answer is not found to be the most convincing by test developers and others. By emphasizing the tensions entailed in our imagined response, we hope to underscore the extent to which all efforts to create effective assessment systems may involve difficult tradeoffs between different needs and goals. In fact, the very effort to find noncontroversial and permanent solutions to
The Search for Consensus these problems may be a manifestation of the same longings for certainty that underlie consensus-based approaches.
Our model of interpretive or hermeneutic conversations is based most directly on Hoy (1994) , Warnke (1994) , and, in part, on a critically elaborated version of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics (1981 Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics ( , 1994 Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics ( /1975 . 8, 9 In hermeneutic conversation, the goal subtly shifts from a focus on achieving agreement to a focus on understanding and learning from different perspectives on the subject matter. Although agreement may be a welcome side effect of hermeneutic conversations, the primary goals are to understand and learn from one another's different perspectives and to allow initial interpretations to be challenged by dialogic partners so that these interpretations can evolve. As Hoy (1994) said this implies that "what one aims at is an understanding of the subject matter and not agreement . . . for the sake of agreement" (p. 266). Hoy (1994) described it: "The hermeneutic model calls for enlarging one's interpretations and enriching them by holding them open to other interpretations" (p. 264) The outcome may or may not result in agreement: "Interpreters can believe that their understanding is reasonable and right without also believing that everyone else will or even should agree with them" (Hoy, 1994, p. 182) . Warnke (1994) suggested that the point is for participants "to be sure their own interpretations are as compelling and inclusive as they can be" (p. 133). Bickford (1996) , a Habermas critic, even noted: "The more we . . . communicate about . . . a thing . . . the more our perspectives may diverge" (p. 164). For example, this occurred in the case study when Kevin's beliefs about the usefulness of peer review in the classroom evolved in ways that diverged from the opinions of others present. Gadamer (1987 Gadamer ( , 1994 Gadamer ( /1975 offers specific suggestions for the participants in a hermeneutic conversation. He expects that all partners in the dialogue are willing to risk their own prejudgments, to look for the coherence in what others are saying, and to believe that they have something to learn from the others. The "art" of conversation is not the art of arguing against the other person, but the art of "questioning" to bring out the strengths in the other's argument (1994/1975, p. 367) . Gadamer (1994 Gadamer ( /1975 ) also highlighted the importance of concrete cases in understanding the very meaning of norms or laws: "What one considers the right decision determines the standard itself" (p. 570). Norms are "indeterminable without the concrete situation in which one thing is preferred to another" (Gadamer, 1990, p. 293) . For Gadamer (1981) , the set of interpreted concrete cases to which a norm has been applied are at least as important as the norm itself: "The body of precedents (the decisions already laid down) is more crucial for the legal systems than the universal laws in accord with which the decisions are made" (1981, p. 82 ).
An approach to dialogue that values dissensus is important because it is true to the diversity resident in the community of participants. However, Gadamer, Warnke, and Hoy also value the process of illuminating differing (often alien) perspectives because it provides an important opportunity for learning. Hoy (1994) suggested that "one can learn more about others and about oneself without the formation of consensus and convergence" (p. 260). Similarly, Warnke (1994) noted:
We need not agree with each other in the end, but we can all come to recognize the partial and one-sided character of our initial positions and incorporate into our more considered views the insights we have come to learn by trying to understand other interpretations of our history and experience. (p. 132) 10 Does that suggest that the outcome of a standards creation dialogue will be a pastiche of differing interpretations? Certainly, we should not expect to reach substantive agreement on every issue that divides us. Hoy (1994) argued, however, that often the outcome is a new interpretation that "resolves or dissolves the conflict" (p. 265). The hermeneutic view of conversation implies that this resolution will not (in a strict sense, cannot) lead to a complete consensus. However, an agreement can often be achieved that is good enough to allow us to accomplish the task at hand, even if each participant may (will always, to one extent or another) interpret this conclusion in slightly different ways.
In the approach to assessment imagined below, we use the term agreement rather than consensus in reference to hermeneutic conversation to highlight a crucial distinction (not clearly distinguished by the theorists cited in this article). With (a Habermasian definition of) consensus, it is assumed that parties reach an understanding that all interpret in the same way. With agreement as we define it, whereas parties accept a particular conclusion in a particular context, what is agreed upon may actually be (and to some extent, always is) interpreted differently by each. The nature of the agreement achieved by Group 2, in the face of substantive differences about the meaning of terms, provides a good example.
Practical Implications of Hermeneutic Conversation
In this section, we consider, speculatively, some practical implications of using hermeneutic conversation rather than consensus-seeking discourse as a model for standards creation/justification dialogues. We start by imagining an example of the standards document produced from a hermeneutic conversation. Then, we speculate about how knowledge of that expectation might shape the process of the committee that developed the document and how it might be subsequently used to inform an assessment development process and ultimately decisions about individual cases. Again, our goal is not to argue for a particular solution to the problems we have raised. Our goal is to illustrate possible practices consistent with more pluralist perspectives, to stimulate readers' own imaginations about alternatives, and to use the comparisons with conventional practice to provoke critical reflection.
A document that reflects a hermeneutic conversation would articulate both the agreements that had been achieved by the committee and the issues The Search for Consensus over which there remained disagreement. It would describe, perhaps in more detail than is typical now, the actual processes through which the committee was selected and the agreed-upon standards were developed. It might summarize the nature of the debate underlying particular standards, how and why the issues were resolved as they were, or what the issues are on which disagreement remains (much as they were characterized in Hattie's [in press] paper or in the summary of our case study). The document would contain a range of concrete examples of teaching and learning practice that were analyzed in terms of the standards produced. These examples would not be brief vignettes to illustrate a particular standard (as is typical of the INTASC content standards and the NCTM standards). They would be more complex, contextualized examples of multiple, potentially conflicting standards.
11 It would also present cases that illuminated the important points of dissensus the committee did not resolve. This complex document could be made more accessible to readers by taking advantage of the hypertext structure that electronic media support and/or by simulating it in a printed document or series of documents.
Looking back at the committee process, we imagine the following manifestations of hermeneutic conversation in practice. First, hermeneutic conversation (and Habermas's discourse ethics) have implications for how a committee might be formed. Members of standards development/ justification committees might be selected not only to represent sociodemographic categories (e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, school context, grade levels taught, professional affiliation), but also with an intent to represent the "broadest possible spectrum of interpretive perspectives, including the views and voices of marginal groups" (Habermas, 1996, p. 183 ). This requires a far more in-depth understanding of the different perspectives within the field and of the perspectives of potential committee members; it glosses over the problem of what it means for an individual to "represent" a perspective (or a demographic group for that matter) (Phillips, 1996) . Second, the committee would likely be informed by much the same data that committees have used in the past (e.g., existing empirical research, theoretical perspectives, other standards documents, and personal experience). There would also be an additional emphasis on developing rich, contextualized concrete examples (evidence-based narratives of students and/or teachers) for reflection as the standards are being developed. These could be developed by the committee members, commissioned, or culled from existing research (ethnographic studies of teaching practice might be particularly useful). This would allow the committee to consider, complexly, how a set of (possibly conflicting) standards might be used in interpreting an individual teacher's performance. Third, we imagine that the expectation of a document reflecting both agreements and disagreements (about standards and concrete cases) would have subtle effects on the shape of the dialogue within the committee, as would the presence of concrete cases. It would alter the nature of the pressures that are put on the committee from the agency responsible for producing the document. (The kind of pressure that the NBPTS exerted on its committee to resolve their differences over subject matter expectations for middle-school generalists would be mitigated.) We imagine that the committee would support participants in exploring their differences without moving too quickly and inevitably to the assimilation of differences into a consensus statement. Gadamer's call for participants to bring out the strengths in one another's positions, risking their own preconceptions, would be privileged. It would encourage participants to view the discovery of substantive disagreements as achievements instead of barriers that must be overcome. Any agreements would be more likely to represent genuine conviction rather than compromise, masked differences, or worse, coercion and acquiescence. As Hoy, Warnke, and Gadamer all argued, these dialogues are transformative: They enable our perspectives to evolve, sometimes retaining their distinctiveness, sometimes toward a new interpretation that resolves or dissolves initial disagreements.
Looking ahead, how might a document resulting from hermeneutic conversation be used to guide assessment practice? How might assessment developers and committee members collaborate in the assessment development process? First, the standards document would present concrete examples of teaching practice that had been analyzed in light of the standards; this would better inform the development of assessment tasks and/or the selection of benchmarks (concrete examples to illustrate different performance levels). The presence of concrete examples or benchmarks to illustrate the standards does not fundamentally change the basic challenge facing judges. Because of the deep and unpredictable complexity of the performances judges are asked to evaluate (for projects like INTASC and the NBPST), determining a score for a particular portfolio cannot escape being a fundamentally interpretive task. One can never entirely predict what specific disagreements a portfolio with particular characteristics may evoke (Moss, Schutz, & Collins, 1998) .
12 Therefore, the job of the judge is to discover what the relevant performance standards and concrete exemplars mean for the kind of score that should be given when these guidelines are used to assess a particular portfolio. As Gadamer described it, it is not simply a matter of applying a predetermined interpretation (in our case, the performance standard) to a particular case; rather, the particular features of the case necessarily "codetermine" the interpretation.
Second, the articulations of differences might be useful as tools to help assessment developers and ultimately individual judges determine the limits of their own mandate from the larger community as communicated through the standards. For instance, the description of unresolved issues could act as alarm triggers for judges to apply to particular portfolios. The job of the judge, we imagine, would include detecting portfolios that illuminate these "faultlines" within the community and then deciding whether it is reasonable to evaluate the portfolio with the agreed upon standards.
Portfolios designated by judges as problematic (or on which judges disagreed substantially) might then be shifted out of conventional assessment practice into a more dialogic context in which a diverse panel of teachers might attempt to explore the disagreements that the larger community might have with respect to this particular portfolio in an effort to reach a more legitimate agreement about the score the portfolio should be given. In a sense, this would entail a shift from a context organized around relatively traditional psychometric assumptions (e.g., consistency among independent judgments of readers trained to apply the standards in the same way) to a context organized around a recognizable activity of collaborative professional judgment.
13 Following Gadamer's (1981) advice, it would be crucial to maintain a process through which controversial portfolios were added to the bank of exemplars (precedents) available to judges and to future committees involved in standards revisions.
Although this second context might provide a way to grapple concretely with portfolios that represent a challenge to the established community agreement, such a supplementary process also creates new problems. Committees formed to create standards, for example, despite their limitations, draw from a wide range of different resources that support them in taking into account the range of perspectives resident in the larger community. In contrast, committees that might assess actual portfolios would have a limited time in which to reach a decision, would be of necessity small (and not adequately representative), and would not be able to seek extensive outside input. Despite their limitations, we argue that these committees could provide, at least hypothetically, an improvement over the currently dominant, consensually oriented approach to assessment.
If agreement could not be achieved after a pragmatically time-limited period of dialogue about the performance level of the portfolio (which could be agreement for different reasons from each person), a decision might be reached by voting, although deciding how to structure this is not a trivial problem. The larger community would need to establish a procedure for counting these votes. The process might place more value on preserving minority opinions by allowing less than a majority of evaluators to promote a teacher to licensure. Conversely, the community might decide that protection of students was paramount, which would allow a minority of evaluators to reject a candidate. Of course, the community could decide on majority rule.
This solution to the problem of creating an assessment system that can encompass the dissensus of a community is imperfect. It is only a partial step toward the acknowledgment of the multiplicity of perspectives resident in the larger community. What would it really mean to "agree" on a statement of our disagreements? Is this any more possible than coming to consensus in the first place? As Warnke (1994) and Hoy (1994) both cautioned, hermeneutic conversation provides no guarantee of fair dialogue:
We cannot just assume that the "equality realized . . . is equality enough" if alternative interpretive options do not have the same social and economic clout, publicity, access to media and so forth. (Warnke, 1994, p. 149) When such fair and inclusive dialogue is not fully possible, "where any action requires an exclusion of some interpretations, we need to both recognize [publicly acknowledge] this exclusion and the possibility of change" (Warnke, 1994, p. 162) . The practices we propose do not overcome the problem of dissensus or of unequal access to the floor. They are, at best, one means for taking them into account in a high stakes assessment process.
Risks of Acknowledging Dissensus
Although we see profound value in considering alternative models of discourse (and acknowledge a bias to hermeneutic conversation over consensus-seeking discourse), we do not intend to argue that there is an obvious choice between models here or that these represent the only (sound) choices. Every choice has consequences. A move toward assessment grounded in hermeneutic conversation could as easily make things worse as better. In this section, we explore some of those risks. Of course, what counts as worse or better and how we will recognize these effects when we observe them is also a matter about which thoughtful educators can (and do) disagree. Our argument, supported by Gadamer, is that by respectfully considering alternative perspectives, we come to a more textured understanding of our current perspective so that it can be either self-consciously reaffirmed or enabled to evolve in productive ways.
As we have argued and illustrated above, a dominant emphasis on consensus risks masking diversity resident in the community and relinquishing authority for consequential decisions to assessment developers who work in far less public circumstances. This raises significant questions about the adequacy of the warrant underlying high-stakes assessment decisions. However, the pluralist alternative to conventional practice that we have pursued, which allows both disagreement and agreement to be represented and taken into account in the assessment process, has substantial risks as well. The assessment process we imagine will cost more. This burden will have to be weighed against the potential benefits and risks to the community of this and other approaches. One of the major goals of this article is to enable that kind of critical reflection by illuminating some of the assumptions, values, and potential outcomes of different approaches.
With hermeneutic conversation, there is certainly the risk that the process will result in a document that is unwieldy and/or that lacks a coherent vision of education. This is a risk that is equally relevant to any process that genuinely attempts to encompass diverse perspectives under a single umbrella (including consensus-seeking discourse). In fact, the NAE Panel on Standards-Based Education Reform worries that any single set of "inclusive" standards accommodating competing perspectives might "do little to provide an effective framework for the field" (McLaughlin & Shepard, 1995, p. 24) . Rejecting the assumption that there is "one best way to define and structure knowledge" (p. 24) in a field, the panel argues for the value of multiple sets of "coherent, professionally credible" standards in a given domain that could serve as exemplars to state and local education agencies. This is an appealThe Search for Consensus ing proposal that would work particularly well in contexts where standards are used as guides for reflection. However, in the case of high-stakes assessment, where all relevant individuals and institutions within a jurisdiction are held accountable, the question of how to justify the use of one set of standards over another (resulting in at least some different decisions about who will be promoted, funded, remediated, graduated, certified, or licensed) becomes problematic. Thus, there may well be trade-offs between coherence and fairness to diverse perspectives within the community. If the proposal for justifying high-stakes assessment is based on the assumption of fair and inclusive dialogue, then the sort of document we are proposing might provide a more frank reflection of the diverse perspectives resident in a field than conventional approaches do.
There is also the risk that when the document we imagine, which would reflect both agreement and disagreement about concrete cases of practice, is shared for wider review, it would generate far more controversy than current standards documents do. It is easy to agree on an abstract standard like "teachers set attainable and worthwhile learning goals for students and develop meaningful learning opportunities" (NBPTS, 1996, p. 16) . However, it is considerably more difficult when the standard is concretized in particular cases of what does and does not constitute worthwhile learning opportunities, and who is or is not deemed accomplished or given a license to teach. Controversy is most likely to arise at the level of concrete examples than at the level of abstract standards. However, we are not prepared to acknowledge that such controversy would be detrimental. Such engagements among teachers and between teachers and other stakeholders might contribute to the slow development of a more democratic culture, one in which members of the community take responsibility for their own decision-making instead, as Gadamer (1994 Gadamer ( /1975 worried, of conceding the task to the expert.
Perhaps the most substantial risk in moving away from a consensusprivileging approach is that it risks undermining the role that professional standards can play in provoking educational reform. The rapidly growing use of standards-based assessment for individual and institutional accountability suggests that many policy makers and stakeholders have a great deal of faith in such tools. The assuring rhetoric of consensus, followed by the professionally sanctioned technology of assessment development, gives the consequential decisions that result from such a process an air of authority and credibility that is currently hard to question.
14 The public acknowledgment of dissensus and of the unavoidable elements of arbitrariness in any assessment process risks undermining the political and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1991) that standards-based assessment programs may need to drive educational reform. No process is ever fully transparent or fully fair and inclusive. Are we better off acting as if we have achieved consensus even if we have not? It is possible that we are.
However, the long-term risks of masking dissensus, and of developing assessments that result in "reliable" decisions in spite of dissensus, may be greater. To the extent that consequential assessment practices shape the values, perspectives, and identities of members of the relevant community (both through selection of members and through the learning opportunities standards promote), these high-stakes assessment practices ultimately risk diminishing the diversity resident in the community. For instance, eliminating controversial teachers from the pool of professionals ultimately has an impact on the makeup of the teacher community that will have primary responsibility for recreating the profession's standards and assessments in the future. If standards are at least partly designed to serve as temporary achievements, open to further review as the field evolves, we must acknowledge that controversial teachers may just as well represent the not yet understood innovators of tomorrow as the problems of today. Decisions about who will join the profession will have as much of an impact on the nature of our dialogic community as it will on the futures of particular children in classrooms.
The Resource of Dissensus
In conventional approaches to the development of standards and assessments, the search for consensus dominates. Dissensus is viewed as a problem to be overcome. Against this perspective, we argue that dissensus is an essential natural resource that should be acknowledged and nurtured alongside the search for consensus or agreement. Although it does not ensure a fair and inclusive dialogue, the representation and exploration of dissensus helps to protect us from the false assurance of an articulated consensus that may underrepresent, misrepresent, or exclude groups of voices within the community. It reminds us at least of the importance of acknowledging the exclusion. As McCarthy (1997) asserted against Habermas's vision of consensus: "Unanimity on practical-political issues is not always attainable and . . . democratic institutions should not be constructed on the supposition that it is" (p. 65).
Dissensus can lay the groundwork for critical evaluation and guard against taken-for-granted beliefs and practices that might dominate our thinking. Hoy (1994) argued: "What opens assertions to critical evaluation are more empirical events, such as finding some conflicting evidence, [or] encountering someone who disagrees" (p. 268). A similar stance was pointedly argued by Messick (1989) , one of the most cited validity theorists in educational measurement:
The very recognition of alternative perspectives about the social values to be served, about the criteria to be enhanced, or about the standards to be achieved should be salutary in its own right. This is so because to the extent that alternative perspectives are perceived as legitimate, it is less likely that any one of these perspectives will dominate our assumptions, our methodologies, or our thinking about the validation of test use. (p. 88) Nurturing dissensus as a counterweight against the too-efficient pursuit of consensus may well enhance our opportunity for learning. The most important question is not how we can reach agreement but rather "how or why our interpretations differ and what new insights . . . . we might glean from the attempt to understand the cogency of interpretations different from our own" (Warnke, 1994, p. 132) .
Finally, nurturing dissensus in turn nurtures the development of a more democratic and diverse "civic" culture. Even under Habermas's model (1996, p. 131) , a civic culture is absolutely crucial for the legitimate development of future standards. Only when the centralized legislative processes he envisioned are informed by a vibrant dialogue and the development of wellconsidered "public opinions," can we hope to justify standards in a way that is truly fair and inclusive. Hoy (1994) Certainly there is more that could be said. Our goal was not to solve the problem of developing ethical assessments in a diverse community, but to illuminate some of the complex issues involved and to provide some theoretical tools for reflection. We take our final cue from Gadamer (1994 Gadamer ( / 1975 , who said at the end of his magnum opus, Truth and Method: "I will stop here. The ongoing dialogue permits no final conclusion. It would be a poor hermeneuticist who thought he could have, or had to have, the last word" (p. 579).
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3
This section draws heavily from Moss and Schutz (1999) . 4 The intent of our case was to illustrate potential problems in the assumptions underlying Habermas's discourse ethics and the rhetoric of standards-based assessment. The specific relevance of this example to other standards development efforts can be supported by the parallels that we have noted with other standards documents and the few existing studies of the actual process of standards or curriculum framework creation (Cornbleth & Waugh, 1995; Hattie, in press; McCollum-Clark, 1995) that consistently point to substantive issues underlying (or at least preceding) the achieved agreement. More generally, the argument about the inherent ambiguity and context specificity of meaning in use is well supported by work in pragmatics, sociolinguistics, discourse analysis, and social theory (Gee, 1999; Levinson, 1983; van Dijk, 1997; Thompson, 1990) . Gee (1999) argued: "Meaning is not general and abstract, not something that resides in dictionaries, or even in general symbolic representations inside people's heads. Rather, it is situated in specific social and cultural practices, and is continually transformed in those practices" (p. 63). Similarly, Ochs (1979 , in Levinson, 1983 argueD: "One must consider the social and psychological world in which the language user operates at any given time . . . the language users' beliefs and assumptions about temporal, spatial, and social settings; prior, ongoing, and future actions (verbal, nonverbal) , and the state of knowledge and attentiveness of those participating in the social interaction in hand" (p. 23).
5
Readers are also told that the committee that drafts these standards is composed primarily of experienced teachers in the subject area along with experts in child development, teacher education, and the relevant academic disciplines. A draft of the content standards is made available for public review and the feedback received is taken into account in the final revision of the standards. 6 For example, note the overlap between the content standard quoted above and the following performance standard: "The level 4 [highest ranked] response shows . . . clear, consistent, and convincing evidence that the teacher sets attainable and worthwhile goals for students learning and makes instructional decisions that enable student writers to achieve those goals" (ETS, 1998, p. 46 ).
7
Although it was not the focus of our case study, critics have also worried that Habermas's distinction between coercion and consensus is too stark to represent actual dialogue. McCarthy (1997) argued that "rationally motivated agreement as a moral-political alternative to coercion may well involve elements of conciliation, compromise, consent, accommodation, and the like" (p. 67; see also Gadamer, 1994 Gadamer, /1975 Both Hoy (1994 Hoy ( , 1997 and Warnke (1994) , who extensively cite Gadamer's work, acknowledge that he can be read as a monist, that the relationship he defines between understanding and agreement can be read as privileging agreement or consensus as an indicator of understanding. Each builds a case for reading Gadamer as a pluralist and use that reading in their characterization of hermeneutic conversation. Gadamer (1997) joined the debate in response to an article by Hoy (1997) : "Perfect understanding surely never means perfect agreement. Mr. Hoy demonstrates this correctly" (p. 130).
9
Hermeneutics characterizes a general approach to the interpretation of meaning reflected in any human product, expression, or action, often referred to as a text or "text analog." For Gadamer (1994 Gadamer ( /1975 , understanding involves exploring the dialectic between the parts of a text and the whole and between the readers' preconceptions and the text. In the case of hermeneutic political theory, Warnke (1994) suggested our task to be "interpreting shared social meaning, public values and common political traditions with the aim of formulating a conception of justice that is congruent with this" (p. 130). By analogy and extension, the complex text analog of a standards creation dialogue in the case of teaching might be conceived at one level as the cases of teaching under consideration or the expressions of our dialogue partners about teaching. At a more general level, it may be conceived as our (teaching professionals and other stakeholders) shared meanings, values, common traditions, and research-based knowledge about teaching and learning.
10
As Warnke (1994) noted, this characterization of the kind of learning that can occur through hermeneutic conversation shares much in common with Habermas's notion of aesthetic (as opposed to practical) discourse. See, for instance, Habermas (1985, pp. 200-202) .
11
The NCTE Standards in practice series (Smagorinsky, 1996) presents more extended vignettes of teaching practice described by the editor as showing "what the standards might look like in actual classrooms." However, these documents do not carry the same authority of professional consensus that official standards do. They bear the name of a single author and no evidence of widespread professional review beyond the routine editorial process. Understandably, given their purpose, they do not illustrate performances that would be considered inconsistent with the standards (as assessment developers must do). Cases like these, however, could provide useful resources for standards committee debate. 12 We worry that one potential response to the problem we have raised is developing more detailed standards intended to eliminate the ambiguity. Were it possible to achieve widespread professional consensus about such standards (we believe it is not), it would be impossible to imagine the range of possible contingencies that individual cases encountered in the future might present to judges. Moreover, the danger that such standards would suppress progress and ossify conventional practice is overwhelming.
13
The NBPTS (ETS, 1998, pp. 40, 56) uses a dialogical practice similar to the one we have described as part of its "small sample" scoring process for certificates when there are insufficient candidates to ensure the full range of benchmark and training papers. 14 We acknowledge that we have written this article with a single voice to enhance its accessibility and persuasiveness, even though we have not achieved full consensus on the choices we have made. It is fair to say that, following a series of hard debates spanning 2 years, we have reached agreement (but not consensus) on the ideas represented in this article. However, we continue to disagree about how to represent our agreement. For instance, Pamela worries that the distinction that we have drawn between agreement and consensus provides an unnecessary complication for our intended audience. Aaron believes that it is crucial to understand our argument. Our stance represents a compromise. Fortunately, unlike most who develop or interpret standards for high-stakes assessment, we have had the luxury of relatively unlimited time and the freedom to develop interpretations that people may freely accept or reject.
